In this paper we survey various classifications of symmetric games and their characterisations under the theme of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce matchings as a convenient characterisation of strategy triviality; and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised symmetric games with numerous examples that range over various classes.
Introduction
The notion of a game being fair may be made more precise with the concept of symmetry. Broadly speaking we will consider a game fair when the players are indifferent between which position they play, however there are several ways to classify symmetry that lead to variations in structure and fairness. For example the players may care about the arrangement of their opponents.
This paper aims to survey numerous classifications of symmetric games and their characterisations whilst filling various holes. Symmetry in the context of games was first explored by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , outlining what we will later refer to as our label-dependent framework in which player permutations act on strategy profiles, consequently requiring all players have the same strategy labels.
Soon after Nash (1951) famously showed that symmetric games have at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium that is invariant under player permutations, while more recently Cheng et al. (2004) showed that fully symmetric 2-strategy games have at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Under the theme of anonymity rather than fairness, Brandt et al. (2009) examined label-dependent classifications where players do not distinguish between their opponents. Nash (1951) , Peleg et al. (1999) , Sudhölter et al. (2000) , and Stein (2011) have examined classifications of symmetry which may not be captured inside our label-dependent framework. In order to discuss such classifications we will need to make a detour to examine morphisms between games, the complexity of which has been investigated by Gabarró et al. (2007) . Inside what will later be referred to as our label-independent framework game automorphisms act on strategy profiles, which also allows players to have distinct strategy labels.
We begin in Section 2 by reviewing numerous mathematical concepts that will play an important role throughout our analysis. In Section 3 we survey various label-dependent classifications of anonymity and fairness.
In Section 4 we review game morphisms while showing that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids, which appears to be missing from relevant literature, and introduce matchings as a convenient characterisation of strategy triviality.
Finally, in Section 5 we survey various label-independent classifications of fairness, discuss how to classify a given game, and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised symmetric games with numerous examples that range over various classes.
Background
In this paper we will only concern ourselves with finite games, consequently all sets are implicitly finite. Let N = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2 and let {A i : i ∈ N } be a collection of non-empty sets, with the Cartesian product of A 1 , ..., A n denoted as × i∈N A i . To simplify notation, for each i ∈ N we denote × j∈N −{i} A j as A −i , for each s ∈ × i∈N A i and i ∈ N we denote the element of A i in position i as s i , and for each s i ∈ A i and s −i = (s 1 , ..., s i−1 , s i+1 , ..., s n ) ∈ A −i we denote (s 1 , ..., s i−i , s i , s i+1 , ..., s n ) ∈ × i∈N A i as (s i , s −i ) .
A relation on A 1 , ..., A n is a subset R of their Cartesian product × i∈N A i . Let i ∈ N , we say that R is i-total when for each s i ∈ A i there exists s −i ∈ A −i such that (s i , s −i ) ∈ R, and i-unique when (s i , s −i ), (s i , s
A normal form game Γ consists of a set N = {1, ..., n} of n ≥ 2 players, and for each player i ∈ N , a non-empty set A i of strategies and a utility function u i : A → R, where A denotes the set of strategy profiles × i∈N A i . We denote such a game as the triple Γ = (N, A, u), where u = (u i ) i∈N . If there exists m ∈ Z + such that |A i | = m for all i ∈ N then Γ is called an m-strategy game. A game may be displayed pictorially as a list of matrices. We list the strategies from players n − 1 and n along the rows and columns respectively, and for games with more than two players have a separate matrix for each strategy combination of the remaining players. Each strategy profile s ∈ A corresponds to a unique cell in one of the matrices where the payoffs are written in the form (u i (s)) i∈N . We find the payoff to player 3 for the strategy profile (b, b, a) ∈ A as follows: reading the strategy profile from left to right, player 1 has chosen the second matrix, player 2 has chosen the second row and player 3 has chosen the first column, the third value of which is the payoff to player 3. Hence u 3 (b, b, a) = 4. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s ∈ A where for each
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We denote the subgroup relation as ≤, the group generated by a subset H of a group G as H , the group of permutations on a non-empty set N as S N , and the subset of transpositions on N as T N . The reader is reminded that the permutations on N are equivalent to the bijections from N to itself, henceforth we will refer to them interchangeably.
An action of a group G on a set N is a homomorphism α from G into the bijections from N to itself. For each g ∈ G and i ∈ N we denote (α(g))(i) as g (i) . When G acts on the left or right of N the action is called a left or right action respectively. We note that left actions can be defined equivalently as antihomomorphisms that act on the right, and dually for right actions.
An action is transitive if for each i, j ∈ N there exists g ∈ G such that g(i) = j, regular if for each i, j ∈ N there exists precisely one g ∈ G such that g(i) = j, and n-transitive if for each π ∈ S N there exists g ∈ G such that g(i) = π(i) for all i ∈ N . When an action of G can be inferred we simply refer to G as being transitive, regular or n-transitive respectively.
The stabiliser of i ∈ N , which we denote as G i , is the subgroup {g ∈ G : g(i) = i} of elements in G that fix i. Similarly the stabiliser of N , which we denote as G N , is the normal subgroup {g ∈ G :
The orbits of N , denoted as N/G, is the set {G(i) : i ∈ N } which forms a partition of N .
By a groupoid we mean a category in which every morphism is bijective. For the sake of brevity, when the objects of a groupoid can be inferred we refer to the morphisms as a groupoid.
Label-Dependent Symmetric Games
There are various ways to define symmetric games, not all of which are distinct. In each case we need all players to have the same number of strategies, consequently all games are implicitly m-strategy games. It is often assumed when defining symmetric games that all players have the same strategy labels and any notion of symmetry will treat the same labels as equivalent. We will refer to these as label-dependent classifications.
Permutations Acting On Strategy Profiles
There is some confusion (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 ) over how to correctly define symmetric games, in order to provide clarity we need to review two ways that player permutations may act on strategy profiles.
Given a permutation π ∈ S N , two action choices are (
The author notes that our somewhat unintuitive notation has been chosen so that it matches with composition and inversion in an ideal manner. That is so for each
Proof. The identity permutation trivially acts as an identity so we need only show associativity.
and s → π −1 (s) are dual to each other. Hence the dual results hold for π −1 .
Lemma:
s → π −1 (s) is a right action of S N on A. Given π ∈ S N we denote the map s → u π(i) (π(s)) as u π(i) • π.
Corollary
: For each π, τ ∈ S N , u (τ •π)(i) • (τ • π) = (u τ (π(i)) • τ ) • π. Proof. For each i ∈ N , s ∈ A, (u (τ •π)(i) • (τ • π))(s) = u (τ •π)(i) ((τ • π)(s)) = u τ (π(i)) (τ (π(s)) = ((u τ (π(i)) • τ ) • π)(s).
Game Invariants
Game invariants give us a notion of players being indifferent between the current positions and an alternative arrangement of positions.
Definition
: π ∈ S N is an invariant of Γ if for each i ∈ N , u i = u π(i) • π.
Lemma:
The invariants of a game form a group.
Proof. Since the identity permutation e ∈ S N acts as an identity on A it follows that u i = u i • e for all i ∈ N , hence e is an invariant. Suppose π ∈ S N is an invariant of Γ, and hence that for
Anonymity Classifications
Before surveying label-dependent classifications of fairness we review various classifications of anonymity introduced by (Brandt et al., 2009 ).
Central to anonymity is the notion that players do not distinguish between their opponents, by which we mean each player merely cares about the strategies being played by their opponents and is indifferent between who is playing them.
Definition: Γ is weakly anonymous if for each
. 
Example
The reader may like to verify that Weak anonymity may be strengthened by requiring the players care merely about the strategies being played and be indifferent between who is playing each strategy, or equivalently, by requiring each player have the same payoff for each orbit in A/S N . The reader may like to verify the orbits of A are given by
Definition: Γ is anonymous if for each
Anonymity may be strengthened also by requiring all players have the same payoff for each orbit in A/S N . The orbits of A for the above game are the same as in Example 3.9, however now all players have the same payoff for each orbit. In a fully anonymous game each player is indifferent between which position they play. Hence fully anonymous games are one class of games that fall under our broad requirements for fairness.
Definition: Γ is fully anonymous if for each
i, j ∈ N , π ∈ S N , u i = u j • π.
Fairness Classifications
Our broad requirements for fairness that players be indifferent between which position they play may be made more precise by requiring the invariants of a game be a transitive subgroup of S N .
3.12 Definition: Γ is standard symmetric (Stein, 2011) if there exists a transitive subgroup H of the player permutations such that for each i ∈ N and
In a standard symmetric game, while being indifferent between which position they play, each player may care about the arrangement of their opponents, or alternatively may distinguish between their opponents. The reader may like to verify that Γ is invariant under (123) and not invariant under (12). Since (123) = {e, (123), (132)} is a transitive subgroup of S 3 , Γ is standard symmetric. Furthermore since (12) is not an invariant the players are not indifferent between all possible position arrangements.
A useful analogy for considering the fairness of Γ is a game with three players sitting in a circle such that each player is indifferent between circular rotations of positions, and not indifferent to their opponents swapping positions.
We obtain a stronger level of fairness by requiring the players be indifferent between all possible position rearrangements, that is by requiring all player permutations be invariants.
Definition: Γ is fully symmetric if it is invariant under S N .
The reader may like to verify that Example 2.1 is invariant under the permutations (12) and (123). For example, let π = (123), then π(
Since invariants are closed under composition and (12), (123) = S 3 , Example 2.1 is fully symmetric.
Next we show that Definition 3.14 can be characterised by various conditions.
Theorem:
The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ is fully symmetric;
(ii) Γ is standard symmetric and weakly anonymous;
Proof. Condition (ii) follows trivially from Condition (i). Now suppose Condition (ii) is satisfied and let H be the transitive subgroup of player permutations under which Γ is invariant. Let π ∈ S N , i ∈ N and τ ∈ H such that τ (i) = π(i).
The converse works the same in reverse giving equivalence of Conditions (i) and (iii).
Condition (i) implies Condition (iv) since T N ⊆ S N , and Condition (iv) implies Condition (i) directly from Corollary 3.3 and that T N = S N . Conditions (iv) and (v) are equivalent since each transposition is its own inverse.
Condition (iii) in Theorem 3.15 was used by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , which was ideal for their chosen notation of permutations acting on the right of players and strategy profiles. Of course any generating set of S N may replace T N in Condition (iv) of Theorem 3.15.
Notably it is easy to mistakingly use the following inequivalent condition: (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) . However this does not permute the players and strategy profiles correctly as the right hand side does not have player π(i) playing the strategy that player i is playing, which we illustrate using Example 2.1.
Let π = (123) ∈ S 3 , the incorrect condition given by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) 
It should be fairly obvious that if we are mapping player 1 to player 2 and player 1 is playing b then we want the mapped strategy profile to have player 2 playing b.
Since T N ⊆ S N , it follows from Condition (v) in Theorem 3.15 that the incorrect condition from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is somewhat surprisingly a more restrictive condition than the conditions in Theorem 3.15. When n = 2, since each transposition it its own inverse, the incorrect condition from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is equivalent to the conditions in Theorem 3.15. We now show that for n ≥ 3 the incorrect condition from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is equivalent to the condition for a game being fully anonymous. (Brandt et al., 2009) The following conditions are equivalent:
Lemma:
(i) Γ is fully anonymous; and (ii) Γ is fully symmetric and u i = u j for all i, j ∈ N .
Lemma
: Let π, τ ∈ S N . If u i = u π(i) • π −1 = u τ (i) • τ −1 for all i ∈ N then u i = u (τ •π)(i) • (π • τ ) −1 for all i ∈ N . Proof. For each i ∈ N , u i = u π(i) • π −1 = (u τ (π(i)) • τ −1 ) • π −1 = u (τ •π)(i) • (π • τ ) −1 .
Theorem:
If n ≥ 3 then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ is fully symmetric and u i = u j for all i, j ∈ N ; and
Conversely suppose Condition (ii) holds, and hence that Γ is fully symmetric.
• (jk) = e, it follows from Lemma 3.17 that u i = u j .
Morphisms Between Games
There are two important reasons why our simplifying assumption that players have the same strategy labels leaves our analysis incomplete. Our first reason is that relabelling the strategies for a standard symmetric game leads to a strategically equivalent game that may no longer be considered symmetric inside our label-dependent framework.
Ideally we want to be able to determine when two games merely differ by player and strategy labels without having to go through and check all possible rearrangements of the labels.
Our second reason is that there are weaker notions of fairness that cannot be captured within our label-dependent framework. As a motivating example consider Matching Pennies.
Example: Matching Pennies
It is clear just by looking at the payoff matrix that Matching Pennies is fair, yet inside our label dependent framework the only invariant is the identity permutation, a problem that persists if we swap the strategy labels for either of the players.
Game Bijections

Definition:
A game bijection from Γ 1 = (N, A, u) to Γ 2 = (M, B, v) consists of a bijection π : N → M and for each player i ∈ N , a bijection τ i : A i → B π(i) , which we denote as (π; (τ i ) i∈N ).
We denote the set of game bijections from Γ 1 to Γ 2 as Bij(Γ 1 , Γ 2 ), or simply S Γ for the bijections from a game Γ to itself. Let g = (π; (τ i ) i∈N ) ∈ Bij(Γ 1 , Γ 2 ), i ∈ N , s i ∈ A i and s ∈ A, using similar notation to our label-dependent framework we denote
Example
Given (a, c) ∈ A and g = (12); 
Lemma
: (h • g)(s) = h(g(s)) for all s ∈ A. Proof. Let k ∈ N , ((h • g)(s)) k = (φ π((η•π) −1 (k)) • τ (η•π) −1 (k) )(s (η•π) −1 (k) ) = φ η −1 (k) (τ π −1 (η −1 (k)) (s π −1 (η −1 (k)) )) = φ η −1 (k) ((g(s)) η −1 (k) ) = (h(g(s))) k .
Corollary: u
Proof. This follows identically to the proof of Corollary 3.3 4.7 Theorem: Game bijections form a groupoid.
Game Isomorphisms
Game isomorphisms are game bijections that preserve strategic structure, they are useful for establishing strategic equivalence between games, or as we will be using them, for considering label-independent classifications of symmetric games.
We will only require the strictest notion of game isomorphism to explore label-independent classifications of symmetric games, treating two games as isomorphic when they differ only by the player and strategy labels. However one can define ordinal and cardinal game isomorphisms by requiring preservation of preferences over pure and mixed strategy profiles respectively, then characterise each by the existence of increasing monotonic and affine transformations respectively (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) .
Definition:
We denote by Isom(Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) the set of isomorphisms from Γ 1 to Γ 2 . The reader may like to verify that the bijection in Example 4.3 is in fact an isomorphism.
Theorem: Game isomorphisms form a groupoid.
Proof. For each
The remaining conditions follow from Theorem 4.7.
Corollary:
Game isomorphisms induce an equivalence relation where games in the same equivalence class have the same strategic structure. There are a finite number of ordinal equivalence classes for games with both a fixed number of players and fixed number of strategies for each of the players. Goforth and Robinson (2005) counted 144 ordinal equivalence classes for the 2-player 2-strategy games.
Bijections Acting on Strategy Profiles
The bijections S Γ from a game to itself form a group that acts on the players and strategy profiles. In fact for an m-strategy game S Γ is isomorphic to the wreath product S N ≀ S M where M = {1, ..., m}, which may be seen by setting
Let G be a subgroup of S Γ . We denote the subgroup of player permutations used by G as − → G . Furthermore, we say that G is player transitive if G acts transitively on N , player n-transitive if G acts n-transitively on N , and onlytransitive if G acts transitively and not n-transitively on N .
Lemma:
Two bijections g, h ∈ G have the same player permutation if and only if they are in the same coset of G/G N .
Proof. Suppose g, h have the same player permutation, then
The converse is obvious.
Hence the factor group G/G N merely tells us what player permutations are used by G.
Corollary: G/G
The isomorphisms from a game to itself form a subgroup of the game bijections called the automorphism group of Γ, which we denote as Aut(Γ). Game automorphisms capture the notion of players being indifferent between the current positions and an alternative arrangement of positions. Note our definition is equivalent to the definition used by Nash (1951) .
For the sake of brevity, we refer to a subgroup of Aut(Γ) as a subgroup of Γ, denote the stabiliser subgroup of Aut(Γ) on N as Γ N , and denote the player permutations used by Aut(Γ) as − → Γ .
Strategy Triviality and Matchings
Now that players need not have the same strategy labels, we seek a way to determine which subgroups of S Γ act on strategy profiles in an equivalent way to permutations for some relabelling of the strategies. Stein (2011) introduced strategy triviality for this purpose.
Definition:
A subgroup G of S Γ is strategy trivial (Stein, 2011) 
4.14 Lemma: (Stein, 2011) 
Corollary: If G is strategy trivial then
Hence strategy trivial subgroups have at most one bijection for each player permutation. Example 5.9 shows that the converse of Corollary 4.15 is false.
Corollary: If G ≤ S Γ is strategy trivial then for each i ∈ N and τ
It follows that all paths from one player to another map the strategies in a canonical manner. Hence if G is also player transitive then the strategy sets are matched such that they can be treated as the same set. We now introduce matchings to formalise what is meant by the strategy sets being matched.
Definition:
A matching of A 1 , ..., A n is a relation M ⊆ × i∈N A i which is i-total and i-unique for all i ∈ N .
Example: Let
From a game theoretic point of view, a matching is a subset M of the strategy profiles where for each i ∈ N and a i ∈ A i there is exactly one s ∈ M such that s i = a i , and hence |M | = m. 
Lemma: {M
ij : i, j ∈ N } is a groupoid.
Proof. It follows by definition that for each
Furthermore, for each π ∈ S N , a matching M induces a game bijection (π; (M iπ(i) )) ∈ S Γ , which we denote as M π . For example given the matching in Example 4.18, M (13) = (13);
Lemma
: M : S N → S Γ is a homomorphism. Proof. Let π, φ ∈ S N , then M φ • M π = (φ; (M iφ(i) ) i∈N ) • (π; (M iπ(i) ) i∈N ) = (φ • π; (M π(i)(φ•π)(i) • M iπ(i) ) i∈N ) = (φ • π; (M i(φ•π)(i) ) i∈N ) = M (φ•π) .
Corollary
If we relabel the strategies played in each s ∈ M to be the same, giving players the same strategy labels, then each permutation π ∈ S N acts on our relabelled strategy profiles equivalently to how M π acts on our original strategy profiles. Hence a subgroup G of S Γ acts on strategy profiles equivalently to permutations for some relabelling of the strategies precisely when G = M− → G for some matching M , which we now show occurs precisely when G is strategy trivial.
Theorem:
Let G ≤ S Γ be player transitive. There exists a matching M such that M− → G = G if and only if G is strategy trivial.
Proof. Suppose there exists a matching
Conversely suppose G is strategy trivial. By Corollary 4.16, for each i ∈ N and τ ∈ − → G there exists
M is a matching since for each j ∈ N and a j ∈ A j , there exists a unique strategy
Hence weakly anonymous games may be characterised as follows, similarly for anonymous and fully anonymous games.
Corollary:
(i) There exists weakly anonymous Γ ′ such that Γ ∼ = Γ ′ ;
(ii) There exists player n-transitive and strategy trivial G ≤ Γ such that for each i ∈ N and g ∈ G i , u i = u i • g; and (iii) There exists a matching M such that for each i ∈ N and π ∈ S N −{i} ,
We denote by M (n, m) the set of matchings for an n-player m-strategy game.
Example: (i) If
(ii) If m = 3 and n = 2 then, letting A 1 = {a, b, c} and A 2 = {d, e, f },
There are a number of ways to count the number of matchings in M (n, m). Below we present one, though note an alternative is to show that M (n, m) ∼ = Bij (A 1 , A 2 
Lemma:
For each n ≥ 2: M (n, 2) is a partition of A; and |M (n, 2)| = 2 n−1 .
Proof. For each s ∈ A, the profile s ′ where each player swaps their strategy choice is the unique profile in A such that {s, s ′ } ∈ M (n, 2). Consequently |M (n, 2)| = Proof. This follows inductively from Lemmas 4.26 and 4.27.
Label-Independent Symmetric Games
Fairness Classifications
Similar to our label-independent characterisations of our label-dependent classifications of anonymity, Theorem 4.23 gives us the following label-independent characterisations of our label-dependent classifications of fairness.
Corollary:
(ii) Γ has a player transitive and strategy trivial subgroup G; and (iii) There exists a matching M and player transitive T ≤ S N such that M T ≤ Aut(Γ).
(i) There exists fully symmetric Γ ′ such that Γ ∼ = Γ ′ ;
(ii) Γ has a player n-transitive and strategy trivial subgroup G; and (iii) There exists a matching M such that M SN ≤ Aut(Γ).
Henceforth we will use fully and standard symmetric to refer to our labelindependent characterisations.
Corollary: If Γ is standard symmetric then there exists a matching
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.22
Remember that the defining features for standard and fully symmetric games inside our label-dependent framework were that players be indifferent between which position they play and the arrangement of the players respectively. Inside our label-independent framework, these defining features capture larger classes of fair games.
Definition:
A game is symmetric (Stein, 2011) if its automorphism group is player transitive and n-transitively symmetric if its automorphism group is player n-transitive.
Example:
The automorphism group of Matching Pennies in Example 4.1 is
Since Aut(Γ) is player transitive, is not strategy trivial and contains no proper transitive subgroups, Matching Pennies is an n-transitively non-standard symmetric game. Peleg et al. (1999) , Sudhölter et al. (2000) considered a game symmetric if Aut(Γ)/Γ N ∼ = S N . It follows immediately from Corollary 4.12 that this is equivalent to a game being n-transitively symmetric, and furthermore that Aut(Γ)/Γ N being isomorphic to some transitive subgroup of S N is equivalent to a game being symmetric.
We now consider games which have a subgroup G isomorphic to S N with G N = {id Γ }. Fully symmetric games obviously satisfy this condition, Example 5.9 shows that the converse of this is false. Below we show that all games satisfying this condition are n-transitively standard symmetric games; the author has been unable to show whether the converse holds.
Proposition:
If Γ has a subgroup G isomorphic to S N with G N = {id Γ } then it is n-transitively standard symmetric.
Proof. n-transitivity of Γ follows from − → G = S N . Now since each n-cycle generates a regular subgroup of S N , the subgroup of G generated by an automorphism whose player permutation is an n-cycle is transitive and strategy trivial, hence Γ is standard symmetric.
We end our exploration of symmetric game classifications with games that have a subgroup G isomorphic to − → Γ with G N = {id Γ }. Standard symmetric games obviously satisfy this condition. To look at the converse we consider the argument used in Proposition 5.6.
If all transitive subgroups of S N had regular subgroups then games with a subgroup G isomorphic to − → Γ with G N = {id Γ } would be standard symmetric. However this is not the case, Hulpke (2005) listed the non-regular minimally transitive permutation subgroups up to degree 30. The smallest example is (14) • (25), (135) • (246) of degree 6 and order 12.
We will see in Example 5.13 that games which have a subgroup G isomorphic to − → Γ with G N = {id Γ } need not be standard symmetric.
Classifying A Game
While our notions of symmetric games give us various descriptive definitions of strategic fairness, they do not give us a constructive way to determine where a particular game lies. We now discuss various strategies for classifying a game. A discussion on finding automorphisms of games can be found in Gabarró et al. (2007) . To test whether a game Γ is fully or standard symmetric: we first try to construct a matching M of the strategy sets where for each profile s ∈ M , all players have the same payoff. If no such matching exists Γ is neither fully or standard symmetric. For example in Matching Pennies, since there does not exist a strategy profile where all players receive the same payoff, we can conclude Matching Pennies is non-standard symmetric.
If such matchings exist: to test for full symmetry we check whether such a matching induces automorphisms for permutations that generate S N ; and to test for standard symmetry we check whether such a matching induces automorphisms for player permutations that generate a transitive subgroup of S N , noting that to conclude non-standard symmetry we must check that the game is not invariant under the bijections induced by any such matching and transitive subgroup of S N .
The reader should note that every n-cycle generates a transitive subgroup of S N , but not all transitive subgroups of S N contain an n-cycle. For example the Klein group {e, (12) • (34), (13) • (24), (14) • (23)} is a transitive subgroup of S 4 .
To test for n-transitivity we check whether there exists automorphisms for permutations that generate S N ; and to test for transitivity we check whether there exists automorphisms for permutations that generate a transitive subgroup of S N , again noting that to conclude only-transitivity we must check that the game is not invariant under any transitive subgroup of S N .
If we know a game is transitive and want to show it is only-transitive, a sufficient condition is to find a strategy profile s ∈ A whose payoffs do not appear elsewhere under all possible permutations. For example consider Example 3.13 and suppose it has an automorphism whose player permutation is (12). The payoffs for the profile (a, a, b) are (3, 7, 4), so we would need a strategy profile s ∈ A with payoffs (3, 4, 7). However no such profile exists, hence Example 3.13 is an only-transitive standard symmetric game.
Parameterised Symmetric Games
Given a subset G of game bijections we construct the parameterised game Γ(G) of G as follows: for each g ∈ G, s ∈ A and i ∈ N , set u i (s) = u g(i) (g(s)). Since automorphisms are closed under composition we have G ≤ Aut(Γ), hence each orbit of (N × A)/ G has the same payoff. We call α, β, γ, δ ∈ R the parameters of Γ(G). Note that distinct parameter choices may lead to strategically inequivalent games, even though both games will have the same automorphism group. All fully symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games are isomorphic to Γ(G) for at least one choice of parameters, hence Γ(G) is a general form for fully symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games, or equivalently standard symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games.
We can define a partial order ≤ on parameterised games as follows: Γ(G) ≤ Γ(G ′ ) when given a set of parameters for Γ(G ′ ) there exists a set of parameters for Γ(G) such that Γ(G) ∼ = Γ(G ′ ). We illustrate our order in Examples 5.8 and 5.10 using the Hasse diagrams for ≤ on parameterised symmetric 2-player and 3-player 2-strategy games up to isomorphism.
Example:
Hasse diagram for ≤ on parameterised symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games up to isomorphism. }, G 31 = G 11 ∪ G 22 .
To construct a symmetric game or an n-transitively symmetric game we use bijections that generate a player transitive or player n-transitive subgroup respectively. To construct an only-transitive symmetric game it is not sufficient to use bijections that generate an only-transitive subgroup, we must construct Γ(G) and check that it is only-transitive. This is due to G possibly being a proper subgroup of Aut(Γ). } then N × A has one orbit under G despite G being an only-transitive subgroup.
To construct a standard symmetric game we use the bijections induced from a matching of the strategy sets and player permutations which generate a transitive subgroup of S N . To construct a non-standard symmetric game, we first choose game bijections which are not obviously from the same matching, construct Γ(G) and check whether it is non-standard symmetric. We construct fully and non-fully symmetric games similarly. α, α α, α, α α, α, α α, α, α α, α, α α, α, α α, α, α α, α, α Γ(G 31 ) α, α, α β, β, β β, β, β α, α, α β, β, β α, α, α α, α, α β, β, β Γ(G 32 ) α, α, α β, β, δ β, δ, β δ, β, β δ, β, β β, δ, β β, β, δ α, α, α Γ(G 21 ) α, α, α β, β, δ β, δ, β σ, ρ, ρ δ, β, β ρ, σ, ρ ρ, ρ, σ ω, ω, ω Γ(G 22 ) α, α, α β, γ, δ γ, δ, β δ, γ, β δ, β, γ β, δ, γ γ, β, δ α, α, α Γ(G 23 ) α, α, α β, γ, δ γ, δ, β δ, β, γ δ, β, γ γ, δ, β β, γ, δ α, α, α Γ(G 11 ) α, α, α β, γ, δ γ, δ, β σ, ρ, τ δ, β, γ τ, σ, ρ ρ, τ, σ ω, ω, ω 
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